BEST PRACTICES in
COMBATING CYBER CRIME

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- Cybercrime
- DoS & DDoS
- Fraud – The Primary Reason?
- Payments Fraud
- FFIEC Guidance June 28, 2011
- Requirements
- FRS Guidance
- Best Practices
- Cybersecurity Assessments
Where do cyber attacks come from?

What is the Motivation?
- Ideology – making a political statement
- Extortion – demand for payment to avoid website attack
- Competition – disrupt a competitors online services
- Fraud – used as a tool to aid in unauthorized financial gain
Trends
How Do Cyber Criminals Gain Access?

- Deception via DDoS
- Spam
- Phishing Attempts
- Spoofed Web Pages
- Popup Ads & Warnings
- Malware (Trojans, worms, etc.)
- Theft (Laptops, thumb drives, etc.)
- Email Attachments
- Downloads
- Social mediums
How Do Cyber Criminals Gain Access?

Denial of Service Attack

DoS & DDoS
What Is a Denial of Service Attack?

- **Objective(s):**
  - Render a service unavailable
  - Cripple the infrastructure

- **Typical targets:**
  - Bank
  - Credit card payment servicers

- **Mode of attack:** Saturate the target with external requests for connectivity or communication
A DDoS attack is performed when hundreds, or possibly thousands, of computers simultaneously request services or bandwidth from the same target computer.

The attack is executed with networks of computers which are controlled by malicious software which has been installed on a user’s computer.

The antivirus detection rate for botnet malware is less than 40 percent. For additional information, visit: [https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/index.php](https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/index.php).
DoS Types

- **Bandwidth drain:** The target computer is overwhelmed by the number and size of files being simultaneously sent to it, thereby draining its available Internet connection.

- **Resource drain:** The target computer is inundated with requests, draining its resources to the point where it is no longer able to respond.
Botnet malware development kits are available for purchase over the Internet.

The most recent versions may cost less than two thousand dollars.

Older versions can be obtained for a few hundred dollars or for free.

Botnet administrators also lease their botnets on a per-project basis.

The DDoS attack application software called Low Orbit Ion Cannon is available for free download from sourceforge.net.
Community banks need to work with their core processors and ISPs to help prevent or at least contain the attack.

The last thing an administrator wants to deal with is a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. Yet, together with the recent rise of hacktivism, DDoS attacks are increasingly becoming a threat that IT admins need to prepare for.

The worst thing about DDoS attacks is that they do not prey on the victim’s weaknesses; therefore, being cautious and using the right tools and protection, as in the case of hacking attacks, is not enough.
Despite the threat, there’s still an effective way to protect your network against these attacks – network design decisions. **The only way to protect against this is by having a system to identify the DDoS source and block it.**

This is easier said than done. Identifying the source of a DDoS attack can be tricky and, in most cases, involves tweaking an intrusion detection system (IDS) to differentiate between legitimate requests and attacks. Testing its effectiveness is not easy either. In any case, this will cause quite a few false positives.
Targeted banks have been very successful in employing numerous means of thwarting the DDoS attacks.

There has been unprecedented sharing of information amongst the targeted banks as well as with their regulators and other government agencies.

Banks are working with service providers to address the problems and to scrub/reduce the attack volumes.

Leading DDoS protection providers (Prolexic, VeriSign, Akamai, etc.)

Internet Service Providers - AT&T, Verizon, etc.
Figure 1 DDoS Attacks Are On The Rise

DDoS attacks

- 2010: 10
- 2011: 13
- 2012: 50

Base: Publicly reported DDoS attacks*

Source: CyberFactors, a wholly owned subsidiary of CyberRiskPartners and sister company of CloudInsure.com
*Countries where these attacks occurred and were reported include: Australia, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Myanmar, Russia, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the US, and the UK

Source: Forrester Research, Inc.
**Figure 2** Downtime Caused By DDoS In 2012 Varied By Industry

**Average outage time**
*(in hours)*

- Government: 16
- Communication/ISPs: 12
- Financial services: 7
- Technology: 3
- Media: 1

Base: 50 publicly reported DDoS attacks in 2012*

Source: CyberFactors, a wholly owned subsidiary of CyberRiskPartners and sister company of CloudInsure.com
*Countries where these attacks occurred and were reported include: Australia, Brazil, Germany, Myanmar, Russia, Sweden, the US, and the UK

Source: Forrester Research, Inc.
Developing Concerns

- Bank service providers as targets

- Overload of key service providers attempting to mitigate the effects of DDoS attacks

- Attacks moving down to banks of lower asset size and with potentially less capability for managing the attacks

- DDoS attacks being used as a diversion while fraudulent wire transfers are being transmitted
Adhere to These Best Practices

- Don’t assign all resources to DDoS mitigation.
- Dedicate at least some staff to watching entry systems during attacks.
- **Make sure everything is patched.**
- Keep your security up to date.
- **Have dedicated DDoS protection.**
- Scrambling to find a solution in the midst of an emergency only adds to the chaos—and any intended diversion.
Payments
Cybercrime

• ACH & Wire Transfers
Technology Enabling Fraud

As payments have evolved significantly, largely due to technological advancements, so has the sophistication of EFT fraud. Expertly crafted emails, malicious links on legitimate websites (such as social networking sites), and other methods are used to place malware within the networks of corporate customers. The malware then harvests security information, including login credentials, subsequently allowing the criminals to initiate electronic payments through hijacked accounts.
Law enforcement agencies are all reporting a significant increase in funds transfer fraud involving the exploitation of valid online banking credentials belonging to small and medium sized businesses.

Eastern European organized crimes groups are believed to be predominantly responsible for the activities that are also employing witting and unwitting accomplices in the United States (money mules) to receive, cash and forward payments from thousands to millions of dollars to overseas locations via popular money and wire transfer services.
Artem Semenov is wanted for his alleged participation in an Eastern European cyber crime ring, operating out of New York, which is known for recruiting money mules to open bank accounts, cashing out money received through unauthorized money transfers, and then transferring the money overseas. An arrest warrant was issued for Semenov in the Southern District of New York on September 29, 2010, after he was charged with conspiracy to commit bank fraud; conspiracy to possess false identification documents; and false use of passport.

Semenov speaks both Russian and English, although his English may not be that good. He tends to stay close to Russian communities. He may enjoy frequenting casinos and playing poker. He may travel to Las Vegas, Nevada.
ALEXANDR SERGEYEVICH BOBNEV
Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud; Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering

REWARD: The FBI is offering a reward of up to $50,000 for information leading to the arrest of Alexandr Sergeyevich Bobnev.

Alexandr Sergeyevich Bobnev was indicted in the Southern District of New York on November 26, 2008, on one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. Bobnev was indicted for his alleged participation in a money laundering scheme involving unauthorized access to the accounts of a major provider of investment services. Bobnev allegedly accessed compromised accounts and wire transferred funds out of these accounts to money mules in the United States. These mules were then responsible for transferring the money back to Bobnev. Between June of 2007 and August of 2007, Bobnev allegedly wired or attempted to wire over $350,000 from compromised accounts.

Bobnev has a Russian Passport and has ties to Russia.
ANDREY NABILEVICH TAAME
Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud; Conspiracy to Commit Computer-Related Fraud (Computer Intrusion); Wire Fraud; Computer Intrusion
REWARD: The FBI is offering a reward of up to $50,000 for information leading to the arrest of Andrey Nabilevich Taame.

traffic for the purpose of online advertising fraud. Using the malware, the Internet traffic was re-routed from websites with which they had no commercial relationship to websites that paid them for online visitors, thus depriving legitimate advertisers of revenue. The malware also prevented the infected computers from obtaining antivirus software updates, leaving them vulnerable to other cyber attacks.

A federal arrest warrant was issued for Taame in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, on October 13, 2011, after he was charged with Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud; Conspiracy to Commit Computer-Related Fraud (Computer Intrusion); Wire Fraud; and Computer Intrusion.

Taame speaks both English and Russian. He holds a Russian passport and Russian citizenship. He may have travelled to Cyprus or Russia.
Eastern Europe is proudly refining its reputation as the world’s top cyberthief place of business, as a group of Russian thieves was accused Tuesday (Aug. 5) of what is possibly the largest high-tech swindle to date. The take? About 1.2 billion usernames and passwords in addition to more than 500 million E-mail addresses, according to a report in The New York Times.

The haul included “confidential material gathered from 420,000 websites, including household names, and small Internet sites,” The Times said.
- **SpyEye**— A Zeus variant that “wakes-up” and steals credentials in real time.

- **OddJob**—Keeps online sessions open after logout by the user

- **Tatanga**— Caused a screen freeze or displays a “please wait” message as it conducts transactions in the background.

- **Zeus Mitmo**— Steals SMS one-time passwords via Social Engineering. Can utilize Smishing to get user to download malware that forwards SMS messages

- **Ramnit Worm** – It was paired with source code from the Zeus botnet, and began targeting financial institution and has the ability to “bypass two-factor authentication and transaction signing systems.”
Effective 1/1/2012:

On June 28th, 2011 the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) released a supplement to the 2005 “Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment” guidance that describes the measures financial institutions should take to protect Internet banking customers from online fraud.
Three Primary Requirements

- Risk Assessments
- Layered Security
- Customer Education & Awareness
In recognition of the constant evolution in online threats, institutions should review and update risk assessments prior to implementing new electronic financial services or at least every twelve months.

Institutions should implement a layered approach to security for high risk Internet-based transactions (i.e. access to sensitive customer information and/or movement of funds to other parties), including at a minimum processes to detect and respond to anomalous or suspicious behavior relating to initial login and to transactions that transfer funds to other parties.
For business/commercial online accounts, layered security at a minimum should include enhanced controls for users granted access or change permissions to administrative and configuration functions.

Institutions' customer awareness and education programs should clearly explain the applicability of Regulation E protections to each account type accessible over the Internet. Further, institutions should take steps to see that customers are informed of security control options and alternatives.
Similar to the 2005 guidance, the June 2011 supplement applies to all electronic banking delivery channels, including the mobile banking channel.

Whether financial institutions provide all or part of their electronic banking activities to customers through in-house systems or outsourced, service-provider arrangements, the institutions are responsible and accountable for conformance with the 2005 guidance and the 2011 supplement.
Specific Practices to Mitigate Risks

- Ensure centralized fraud detection systems facilitate monitoring across payment channels (i.e., ACH transactions, wire transfers, cards, checks, ATM transactions)
- Review security provisions in customer agreements (agreement alone may not alleviate bank from liability)
- Implement procedures for monitoring new and existing accounts (for new accounts, monitor for ACH credits “money mule activity”)
Specific Practices to Mitigate Risks

Education should include:

- Use of a single purpose, stand-alone computer for Internet banking (no email/web surfing/downloading)
- Monitor accounts daily for unusual activity – notify FI immediately of any errors
- Implement dual controls and separation of duties
- Maintain up-to-date anti-virus, spyware and firewall protection
- Use the strongest form of authentication provided by the bank
- Apply security patches quickly, consistently and comprehensively
- Contracts/Agreements
Out-of-Band

Username

Tokens

Passwords

Internet

Call me!!
- Rapid adoption of mobile banking
- Increasing adoption of mobile banking by customers
- Majority of banks have adopted/are adopting mobile banking
- Mobile banking functionality is increasing
- Cyber criminals are following the money
- Banks need to assess and manage associated risks
Mobile Banking Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Percent of cell phone users who use mobile banking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-49</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-64</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pew Research Center Survey, July 2013
Account takeovers/fraudulent electronic funds transfers

Exposure of nonpublic customer information

Distributed denial-of-service attacks

Destruction/theft/leakage of internal bank information

Impersonation of bank communications

Another expense and operational challenge
Malware and risks
• Account takeovers
• Credit theft and identity spoofing
• Payment fraud
• Mobile wallets
• Mobile e-commerce
• Browser and application spoofing

Security and mitigation
• Content security
• Data loss protection
• Malware detection
• Loss and theft response
• Layered security
• Risk assess accounts
• Anomaly detection
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity

Version 1.0

February 12, 2014
The Framework Core consists of five concurrent & continuous functions:

- Identify
- Protect
- Detect
- Respond
- Recover
Cybersecurity

The process for managing cyber threats and vulnerabilities and for protecting information and information systems by identifying, defending against, responding to, and recovering from attacks.
Cybersecurity Preparedness

In terms of:

- Risk exposure,
- Risk management, including controls to address the risks, and
- Knowledge gaps and proposed strategies to address the gaps.
Assessment of Cyber Security

- Risk Management & Oversight
- Threat Intelligence & Collaboration
- Security Controls
- External Dependency & Vendor Management
- Incident Management
Directors need to understand and approach as an ERM issue, not just an IT issue.

Directors should understand the legal implications of cyber-risks.

Boards should have adequate access to cybersecurity expertise.

Discussions about cyber-risk management should be given regular and adequate time on the board meeting agenda.

Directors should set the expectation that management will establish an enterprise wide, cyber-risk management framework.

Discussions of cyber-risks between boards and senior managers should include identification of which risks to avoid, accept, mitigate, or transfer.

GovInfoSecurity
- Preventative Controls - impede threats from exploiting a weakness

- Detective Controls - Identify presence of a vulnerability or threat

- Corrective Controls – recovery from cyber attacks or threat mitigation
Questions
FBI Alert: Fraudulent ACH Transfers
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel09/ach_110309.htm

FDIC Special Alert: Fraudulent Electronic Funds Transfers

FDIC Special Alert SA-185-2009 Fraudulent Funds Transfer Schemes

NACHA Bulletin: Corporate Account Takeovers
FFIEC Guidance Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment
http://www..ffiec.gov/press/pr101205.htm

Identity Theft Red Flags Rule

FDIC Guidance on Mitigating Risks from Spyware

Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards (GLBA)
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/interagencyguidelines.htm
Regulatory Guidance

- SR 13-19: Guidance on Managing Outsourcing Risk
- SR 12-14: Revised Guidance on Supervision of Technology Service Providers
- SR 11-9: Interagency Supplement to Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment
- SR 09-2: FFIEC Guidance Addressing Risk Management of Remote Deposit Capture
- SR 06-13: Q&A Related to Interagency Guidance on Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment
SR 05-23: Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice

SR 05-19: Interagency Guidance on Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment

FFIEC Risk Management of Remote Deposit Capture

FFIEC Information Security Booklet

SR 01-15: Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information

SR 01-11: Identity Theft and Pretext Calling—(attachment) Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information